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. NEW MEXICO 
v. 
~ Cert to N.M. S.Ct. (Riordan, 




(gran ted new trial) State /Criminal Timely 
~~LA-~ ~I-ii_ 
~ZJ/A..~~~~~ 
 ~ ttrz..i·lA,.__   
SUMMARY: Petr contends that the N.M. s.ct. erred in - l.~ · 
that the~r*nta~~ause precluded admission into 
evidence of the hearsay inculpatory confession of a co-defendant 
without first considering the statement's indicia of reliability. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: On February 12, 1982, the 
body of one Eastman was discovered next to a rural highway in New 
I Mexico. Eastman's throat had been cut, and he had been shot 




Boeglin and Conner were arrested driving Eastman's ce~;r. 
Following the arrest, Boeglin made a statement to the '. 
authoritie s . In this statement, he confessed that he had cut ---Eastman's throat. He also stated that resp had fired one of th e -------==== 
bft.J~ts which struck Eastman. 
Resp, Boeglin, and Conner were each tried separately. Resp 
was charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, kidnapping, 
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance 
(methamphetamines), and possession of a controlled substance 
(same). Resp's first trial ended in a mistrial. Prior to the 
second trial, petr and resp argued the admissibility of Boeglin's 
statement, petr arguing that it was admissible because it was a 
statement against Boeglin's penal interest and thus an exception 
to the hearsay rule under the New Mexico Rules of Evidence. The 
trial court noted that the statement was self-incriminating and 
that it was corroborated by evidence given at the first trial but 
reserved ruling on the question. 
At the second trial, petr called Boeglin to the stand, but 
he refused to answer questions, citing his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. At petr's request, the 
trial court granted use immunity to Boeglin, but Boeglin 
continued to refuse to testify. Even after the trial court 
explained to Boeglin that he could not claim his Fifth Amendment 
right in the face of use immunity, Boeglin continued to refuse to 
testify. He was cited for contempt and excused. At that point, 
petr moved to have Boeglin declared unavailable, which motion was 





then allowed into evidence, and resp was convicted o,n all counts 
and sentenced to life in pr i §.P, n. --Resp then appealed to the N.M. s.ct., claiming in part that 
the admission of Boeglin's confession unconstitutionally violated 
his right to confront witnesses against him. The N.M. s.ct. 
noted that Boeglin was clearly unavailable to testify. Then, 
relying on Douglas v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 415 (1965), the court 
held that admission of the confession was unconstitutional. 
Specifically, the court noted that the facts in vr(cuglas were 
essentially identical to the facts here: An accomplice, who was 
called as a state's witness and refused to testify on Fifth 
Amendment grounds, had previously confessed to the crime and had 
implicated Douglas in the confession. Given this Court's Douglas 
holding that the confession should not have been allowed, the 
N.M. s.ct. disallowed Boeglin's confession here. 
The N.M. S.Ct. distinguished Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980), as allowing a prior statement only when there had 
previously been an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. (In 
Roberts, the witness had testified at the preliminary hearing.) 
Although the court noted the general test indicated in Roberts 
for constitutionality under the Confrontation Clause (if a 
statement falls within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, it 
may be presumed to be adequately reliable to be constitutionally 
admitted), it distinguished Roberts on its facts. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr first argues that the Court should 
grant cert in this case because the opinion below illustrates 
significant recurring problems about the relationship between the 
( 
-':t-
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause. Specific~lly, petr 
contends that the opinion of the court below, which con::luded 
that Roberts was restricted to situations in which the 
opportunity to cross-examine had been present extrajudicially, 
read Roberts too narrowly. Petr also notes that other cases 
purporting to apply Roberts have not relied simply on the 
presence of a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception but have gone on 
to consider indicia of reliability as well. Finally, petr 
contends that the N.M. s.ct. 's reliance on Douglas in this case 
illustrates a seeming inconsistency between early Confrontation 
Clause cases such as Douglas, where the emphasis was on the 
ability to cross-examine, and later cases such as Roberts, where 
the emphasis is on reliability factors represented by established 
hearsay exceptions and not exclusively on the availability of 
cross-examination. 
Secooo, petr argues that the opinion below conflicts with 
decisions by other federal and state appellate courts. Those 
courts, contends petr, have allowed admission of statements that 
were not subject to cross-examination when those statements were 
de te rmi ned to have adequate indicia of reliability. In this 
context, petr cites u.s. v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769 (CA2), 
cert. denied, 104 s.ct. 704 (1984): u.s. v. Lisotto, 722 F.2d 85 
(CA4), cert. denied, 104 s.ct. 1682 (1984): State v. Parris, 654 
F.2d 77 (Wash. 1982). In these cases, asserts petr, such 
statements were examined for reliability by the reviewing courts 





Third, petr asserts sii'!PlY that the decision belpw is wrong, 
that it is inconsistent with the recent decisions of this Court, 
and that it would prevent the admission of obviously reliable 
evidence. 
Resp contends that in fact there is no tension bet~en 
Douglas and this Court's later decision~. Resp notes that, 
despite the Roberts language relied on by petr, this Court has 
never held that a statement by a non-testifying accomplice or co-
defendant in custodial interrogation is admissible where that 
witness has not previously been subject to cross-examination. 
Further, resp argues that the fact that a statement falls 
within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule does not 
conclusively prove that it is reliable. In fact, resp notes that 
the courts that have allowed such statements have made 
independent determinations of the indicia of reliability. And, 
resp ootes, one of the factors courts have considered in factual 
situations similar to this case is whether an accomplice may be 
trying to curry favor with the authorities by inculpating a third 
party. See, e.g., Katsougrakis, supra, 715 F.2d at 775. This 
factor, notes resp, has been viewed with suspicion by other 
courts arrl is clearly present in this case. As a general rule, 
resp argues, statements made by a non-testifying accomplice or 
co-defendant while in custody simply do not bear the indicia of 
reliability necessary to bring them within the Roberts 
formulation. Thus, the Court's Douglas decision has rot 





Finally, resp argues that the N.M. s.ct. 's reliapce on 
Douglas was correct in this situation. Resp notes that here 
Boeglin was not under oath when the statement was made, was never 
subjected to cross -ex ami nat ion, had admi t ted to the use of 
methamphetamines prior to being interrogated, minimized in his 
statement his own participation in the crime (and actually denied 
it completely in other statements), and never indicated precisely 
who the other persons incriminated in his statement were. 
4. DISCUSSION: There does appear to be some confusion 
among the lower courts as to how broadly Roberts should be read. 
Most courts have declined to go so far as petr would suggest and 
have, when allowing a statement in to evidence bee au se it is based 
on a firmly rooted hearsay exception, gone on to consider its 
specific indicia of reliability as well. On the other hand, the 
V N.M. s.ct. 's interpretation of Roberts as allowing a statement in 
only w been available for cross-
examination seems narrower than the general interpretation 
(although not actually inconsistent with the holdings of this 
Court 's c ase s) . 
This case does, however, seem to be factually 
--------- z:. 
indistinguishable fran Douglas. Here the statement sought to be 
introouced was a confession of an accomplice that was made during .....__.__..-
the accomplice and 
~'-~'-~----~------~ 
the defendant, and the reason that the accomplice was unavailable ---was that he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege. In addition, 
the Court did not explicitly overrule Douglas in Roberts, so it 
would appear to sti 11 be gooo law. Further, none of the lower 
courts that have addressed this factual situation since Roberts 
I 
have come to a different cooclusion. See, e.g., Olsori v. Green, 
668 F.2d 421 (CA8), cert. denied, 102 s.ct. 2303 (1982) (same 
----------result as Douglas and N.M. s.ct. ~w). In fact, i~:_:veral of 
·-·- ··-~ 
the cases cited by petr the courts have noted that this 
situation, with a statement s tody, 
is particularly fraught with the potential iability. -
Finally, the factors mentioned by resp do indicate that the case 
for inferring reliability from the external circt.nnstances of this 
case is less than compelling. 
Thus, although this is an area that the Court might want at 
some point to clarify and the N.M. s.ct. did seem to read Roberts 
more narrowly than other courts have in other factual contexts, 
( 
the particular facts of this case and the N.M. s.ct. 's reliance 
on Douglas as controlling make this a 
I 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell March 29, 1986 
From: Bill 
Re: New Mexico v. Earnest, No. 85-162 
Cert to New Mexico Supreme Court 
Argument date: April 1, 1986 (Tuesday) 
'-
Question Presented 
Does the Confrontation Clause require exclusion of an un-
cross-examined statement by an accomplice, made in response to 
police interrogation, where the statement implicates the 
defendant and where the accomplice is unavailable to testify? 
Statement of Facts 
2. 
This case arises out of a dru~-related ~urder. The 
victim's body was found on a roadside on February 12, 1982. The 
victim had been shot twice in the head and his throat was cut. 
Police determined that the knife wound had not been deep enough 
to kill the victim, but that the victim had died from the gunshot 
wounds instead. The same day that the body was found, police 
found respondent, Boeglin, and Connor driving the victim's truck; 
the three men were arrested for murder. 
Boeglin was then interrogated by police. Boeglin 
suggested that he wanted to make some kind of deal with police, 
because he feared what might happen to him in prison. His 
interrogator made no promises, save that he would tell the 
prosecutor if Boeglin told the truth. Boegl in then confessed, 
explaining that the three men had killed the victim because they 
thought he was a government agent. Boeglin stated that he 
personally had cut the victim's throat, but that the knife was 
dull and had not cut very deeply. Boeglin also stated that 
respondent was the one who shot the victim in the head. 
The three defendants were tried separately for murder. 
When respondent was tried, the government sought to introduce 
Boeglin's confession. Boeglin was put on the stand and given use 
immunity, but he still refused to testify to the events 
surrounding the murder, making it impossible for respondent to 
~
cross-examine him. On respondent's motion, the TC granted a 
.Jo 
mistrial.l Respondent was then retried. , Boeglin ~gain refused 
to~. This time, 
into e_yidence dir~tly, and the TC admitted it. Respondent was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed. The court found 
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 415 (1965) controlling. In Douglas, 
as here, a codefendant confessed and implicated the defendant; in 
Douglas this Court held that the introduction of the 
codefendant's confession violated the Confrontation Clause. The 
v 
court next addressed the argument that Ohio v. Roberts, 448 u.s. 
56 (1980) altered Douglas. Roberts, the court noted, involved 
preliminary hearing testimony that was subject to cross-
examination. In this case, the out-of-court statement was un-.--------
cross-examined. The court concluded that Roberts foreclosed the 
admission of ~hearsay as to which there was no opportunity for 
cross-examination. This Court granted cert. 
Discussion 
lwhen Boeglin was put on the stand and given use 
immunity, the TC told him that he would cit~ for 
c~l contempt if he did not testify. Boeglin 
nevertheless refused to answer 26 separate questions; the 
TC imposed a one-year sentence for contempt for each 
failure to answer. Respondent moved for a mistrial on the 
ground that Boeglin was being coerced. When it became 
clear that Boeglin was not going to testify 
notwithstanding the TC's threats, respondent sought to 
withdraw his motion for a mistrial. The TC granted a 
mistrial anyway. The decision to grant a mistrial was 
affirmed by the New Mexico Supreme Court; respondent 
separately petitioned for cert to review that decision. 
The cert petition, No. 84-6791, is pending (held for this 
case).-----
4. 
1. At the outset, I note that 'the New ME;xico Supreme 
Court's opinion plainly misdescr ibes Roberts. Under the state 
~
court's construction of Roberts, all hearsay exceptions other 
than those involving prior recorded testimony would be 
unconstitutional. As United States v. Inadi, 84-1580 (March 10, 
1986) shows, that is obviously not the law. 
But although some of the court's discussion is just wrong, 
on the narrow issue, for the reasons that follow, I think the New 
Mexico Supreme Court reached the correct result. 
2. In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 u.s. 415 (1965), the Court 
created what appeared to be a per se rule barring introduction of 
one defendant's confession against another defendant. In Bruton 
v. United States, 391 u.s. 123 (1968), the Court extended that 
rule, and found that where the codefendants were tried together, 
one defendant's confession could never be introduced at all--even 
with a limiting instruction--because of the potential that the 
jury would apply it against the non-confessing defendant. 
v ~ 
Unless they have been modified, Douglas and Bruton govern 
this case. The state makes two arguments for the proposition 
that Douglas and Bruton have been narrowed by subsequent 
developments; both arguments rest on dicta in Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 u.s. 56 (1980). 
According to the state, Roberts stated a general rule that 
hearsay is admissible under the confrontation clause if (1) the 
declarant is unavailable, and ( 2) the declaration is reliable. 
See 448 u.s., at 65-66 • In this case, there is no doubt that 
. ..
::>. 
Boeglin was unavailable to testify--he was given use. immunity and 
still refused to testify about the events surrounding the murder. 
Thus, the state argues, under Roberts Boegl in's confession was 
admissible if it was sufficiently reliable. Roberts further 
stated that "[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case 
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception." 448 u.s., at 66. The state contends that Boeglin's 
confession was a statement against penal interest, and therefore 
falls within a "firmly rooted exception." Alternatively, 
Boeglin' s confess ion has strong indicia of reliability because 
pieces of it are corroborated by other evidence in the case. 
3. In evaluating these arguments, the first question is 
whether Roberts affected Douglas and Bruton at all. In light of 
~your opinion in United States v. Inadi, 84-1580 (March 10, 1986), 
you might think the answer is no. Inadi emphasized that Roberts 
has to be read in light of its own facts--that Justice Blackmun's 
opinion in that case did not constitute any major rewriting of 
Confrontation Clause precedent. Slip op. at 5-6. Thus, in this 
case, one might logically argue that Roberts is irrelevant on its 
facts (Roberts involved preliminary hearing testimony, not a 
codefendant confession), and proceed to consider whether Douglas 
and Bruton still make sense. 
Unfortunately (at least in my view) , that reasonable 
v 
approach appears foreclosed. In Lee v. Illinois, No. 84-6807 
(argued Dec. 9, 1985), Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court--
not yet announced--explicitly concludes that if the state can 
.. , 
b. 
show that a codefendant confession is especially reliable, it can 
be admitted against a non-confessing defendant. Lee, 4th Draft 
at 12-13. 2 As I understand the situation from Justice Brennan's 
clerks, the relevant discussion was inserted at Justice 
O'Connor's insistence; it is thus unlikely that it will be 
removed in any subsequent editing. Thus, under Lee, 
the state's threshold argument in this case is a winner, and 
courts must consider whether a codefendant confession either fits 
within a "deeply rooted hearsay exception," or has special 
indicia of reliability. 
4. Boeglin's confession in this case does not fall within 
any deeply rooted hearsay exception. The state contends it is a 
declaration against penal interest. That's obviously correct, as 
to those parts of the confession that implicate Boeglin himself. 
Boeglin's penal interest. On the contrary, Boeglin has a strong 
interest in so testifying: the stab wounds that Boeglin admits 
inflicting did not kill the victim; rather, the gunshot wounds to 
the head were the cause of death. By claiming that respondent 
was the triggerman, Boegl in may have sought to protect himself 
against the death penalty. Alternatively, Boeglin may have 
sought to gain police favor (and a more favorable bargain) by 
identifying another killer more culpable than himself. Both 
2Justices Marshall, Stevene9snd O'Connor have joined 
Justice Brennan's opinion in ee. You are in dissent. 
- -~ 
I • 
potential motives belie the contention that Boeglinl.,s implication 
of respondent was somehow against Boeglin's penal interest. 
5. Thus, the question is whether there are some special 
indicia of reliability that require this statement to be admitted 
-------------~ 
notwithstanding the "presumption of unreliability that attaches 
to codefendants' confessions." Lee v. Illinois, 4th draft at 12 
(not yet announced) . For the reasons stated in the last 
paragraph, I think the answer is no. Boegl in had a definite 
incentive to implicate someone other than himself as the 
triggerman. That alone makes it seem unfair to use Boeglin's un-
cross-examined confession against respondent. The state tries to 
counter this argument by pointing to details of Boeglin's 
(.~.~.~~> 
statement that are corroborated by other evidence. There 1s no 
need to discuss that argument in any detail, because the central 
feature of Boeglin's ment (at least for purposes of 
respondent's trial)--the identification of respondent as the man 
who shot the victim in the head--is not independently 
corroborated. Absent Boeglin's statement, there appears to be 
nothing on which to base a conclusion that respondent rather than 
Boeglin shot the victim. For this reason, I would conclude that 
Boeglin' s statement has no special indicia of reliability, and 
that the New Mexico Supreme Court correctly reversed respondent's 





I would affirm. The New Mexico Supreme Court applied a 
thoroughly faulty analysis, but its judgment was correct under 
Douglas v. Alabama, as modified by Ohio v. Roberts. Respondent 
was improperly convicted based in part on a codefendant's 
~~--------------~ 
confession, and there are no special circumstances that render 
the codefendant confession especially trustworthy. 
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.JUSTICE w ... ..J. BRENNAN, ..JR. 
Mexico v. Earnest 
85-162 
pril 17, 1986 
~vV~ 
I -~ 
e~ .JH> ~ 
~.,-~ f 
Dear Bill: ~ ~ ~ 
Do we really need anything more than the last ~~ 
sentence of your proposed per curiam, sans the word , Al[fl~ · 
"therefore"? I think that is the usual form GVR's LX/ 
take, is it not? ~ 
As for the per curiam, my worry is that it may 
be taken as an obtri9~eversal, rather than as an v ,-
instruction to t e sta e court to review its decision ~ 
in light of Lee. It seems to me that the cites to ~}-
Roberts, Ina~ and other cases will simply reinforce L/[ · 
the impression that this is a reversal, which of 
course it is not. ~ 
In short, would not the usual form of GVR ~ 
disposition suffice? I feel strongly on this one. ~ 
---------? &- !/ ~ 
Sincerely, 
t.)Jf'J,l.. }-rL ;;, 
Justice Rehnquist 
To the Conference 
'•. 
CHAM15ERS Of' 
..JUSTICE w .. . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
t!t '• 
Dear Bill: 
New Mexico v. Earnest 
85-162 
April 17, 1986 
Do we really need anything more than the last 
sentence of your proposed per curiam, sans the word 
"therefore"? I think that is the usual form GVR's 
take, is it not? 
As for the per curiam, my worry is that it may 
be taken as an outright reversal, rather than as an 
instruction to the state court to review its decision 
in light of Lee. It seems to me that the cites to 
Roberts, Ina~ and other cases will simply reinforce 
the impression that this is a reversal, which of 
course it is not. 
In short, would not the usual form of GVR 
disposition suffice? I feel strongly on this one. 
Sincerely, 
IJ 7 f'J , 7.. } ·TL 
Justice Rehnquist 
To the Conference 
~ltpl"ttttt Qfttttrl 4tf tltt ~tb ,StaUs 
._-ufringhm. ~. <!f. 20~~' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 18, 1986 
Re: No. 85-162 New Mexico v. Earnest 
Dear Bill, 
It would have been quite reasonable to simply "hold" 
this case for Lee v. Illinois, in which case the simple 
"grant, vacate:-and remand" for that case suggested in your 
letter of April 17th would have been the logical result. 
But instead we granted the case and heard oral argument in 
it, and I therefore think it is worth the effort to get 
something more out of the time we have put 1nto it than the 
disposition which you propose. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico expressed the view in 
its opinion in this case that hearsay evidence violated the 
Confrontation Clause unless there had been a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant in some sort of a 
judicial proceeding. It found support for this view in two 
cases from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, cited 
in my circulating draft in the present case. I understood 
from the Conference discussion that a majority thought this 
view was incorrect, and I think it is appropriate to say so 
in an opinion dealing with the present case. One could say 
that implicitly your circulating opinion in Lee v. Ilinois 
reaches the same conclusion, but it does not say so in so 
many words. I think a simple grant, vacate, and remand to 
the Supreme Court of New Mexico in the light of Lee would be 
considerably less clear in pointing out to that court its 
mistake than the proposed Per Curiam which I have 
circulated. ---
Sincerely~ 
Justice Brennan ;+ 's 
cc: The Conference 
.ju;n-tmt Qlonrt of tltt ~b ~ta.tt· 
.. ZUtlfinght~ ~. <q. 2ll~,.~ 
CHAMB!:RS Of" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
April 21, 1986 
RE: 85-162 - New Mexico v. Earnest 
Dear Bill:· 
I join the April 17 draft of your per curiam. 
Regards, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
'. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White 
REVISIONS THROU~H Justice Marshall 
Justice Elackmun 
Justice Powell 
Justice Stevens p Justice O'Connor 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-162 
NEW MEXICO, PETITIONER v. RALPH 
RODNEY EARNEST 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW MEXICO 
[April -, 1986] 
PER CURIAM. 
Respondent Earnest was tried, found guilty by a jury, and 
sentenced on charges of murder and other offenses in a New 
Mexico trial court. On appeal the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico reversed his conviction because of its view that the 
admission against him of an out-of-court statement of a co-
defendant violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
- N. M. -, 703 P. 2d 872 (1985). 
The statement in question was a taped declaration by one 
Phillip Boeglin who, along with respondent and one Perry 
Connor, was charged with the crimes in question. The State 
called Boeglin to testify against respondent, but he refused, 
asserting a Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court 
granted Boeglin use immunity, but he persisted in his refusal 
to testify. Boeglin was held in contempt and excused from 
the witness stand. The State then offered the taped declara-
tion Boeglin made to police officers shortly after his arrest. 
Since Boeglin never testified at respondent's trial, nor in any 
prior proceeding, respondent had no opportunity to cross-
examine him about his prior declaration. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that under our de-
cision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), unless there 
has been an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in an 
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earlier judicial proceeding, the admission of an out-of-court 
declaration from a witness such as Boeglin violates a defend-
ant's Confrontation Clause rights. In so holding the 
supreme court relied upon two cases from the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit, United States v. Allen, 409 F. 2d 
611 (CAlO 1969), and United States v. Rothbart, 653 F. 2d 
462 (CAlO 1981). * 
In Ohio v. Roberts, supra, we said with respect to a hear-
say declaration where the declarant was unavailable as a trial 
witness: 
"[H]is statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 
'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can be inferred with-
out more in a case where the evidence falls within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the ev-
idence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 448 
U.S., at 66. 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico was therefore wrong in 
thinking that the analysis in Ohio v. Roberts would allow a 
hearsay declaration to be admitted into evidence only if there 
had been a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant 
in a judicial proceeding. Although hearsay statements made 
by codefendants like the one at issue in the instant case are 
generally presumed to be unreliable, under Ohio v. Roberts 
the State nevertheless must be provided an opportunity to 
*The New Mexico Supreme Court also believed that Douglas v. Ala-
bama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965), was "directly on point" and mandated there-
versal of respondent's conviction. - N. M. -, -, 703 P. 2d 872, 
- (1985). To the extent that Douglas v. Alabama interpreted the Con-
frontation Clause as requiring an opportunity for cross-examination prior 
to the admission of a codefendant's out-of-court statement, the case is no 
longer good law. Although Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), did not 
attempt to set forth specific standards for constitutional admissibility appli-
cable to all categories of hearsay, see United States v. Inadi, - U. S. 
-, - (1986), that decision did make it clear that a lack of cross-exami-
nation is not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of evidence under the 
Confrontation Clause. See Lee v. Illinois,- U.S.-,- (1986). 
.. .. "" 
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demonstrate that a particular codefendant statement bears 
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy Confrontation 
Clause concerns. See Lee v. Illinois,-- U.S.--,--
(1986). If the codefendant is unavailable and the State 
makes a sufficient showing to rebut the presumption of un-
reliability attaching to the codefendant's extra-judicial state-
ment, then the testimony is constitutionally admissible, 
whether or not it was subject to cross-examination in a prior 
judicial proceeding. 
In Lee v. Illinois, supra, also decided today, we analyze in 
greater detail the nature of the inquiry into "indicia of reli-
ability" of a hearsay declaration by a codefendant which in-
criminates one in the position of respondent in this case. We 
therefore vacate the judgment of the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico and remand the case to that court for reconsideration 
in light of our decision in Lee v. Illinois. 
It is so ordered . 
CH"MBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
Jnvrtntt <!l.LtUrt rl t4t ~nittb Jbdt.tr 
Jla.&'lfhtgton, ~. <11· 2llp~~ 
April 23, 1986 
No. 85-162 New Mexico v. Earnest 
Dear Bill, 
I agree with your revised Per Curiam. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: April 24, 1986 
RE: New Mexico v. Earnest, No. 85-162 
2nd Draft Per Curiam 
Justice Rehnquist has made 
~ 
signifi~n~es in 
the p.c. in this case. On page 2, the p.c. now explicitly 
states that "hearsay statements made by codefendants like 
the one at issue in the instant case are generally 
presumed to be un~li__ab.lj ." It goes on to state that, 
under Ohio v. Roberts, states must nevertheless be given 
the opportunity to rebut that presumption. This correctly 
states the law as it will stand once Lee v. Illinois, No. 
84-6807, is handed down. 
I note also that the one cite to Inadi in this 
opinion--see p. 2, n. *--is substantively accurate. I see 
no reason not to join the p.c. (Mike has seen this draft 
as well, and he sees nothing that might conflict with 
either Brennan's opinion or the dissent in Lee, or with 
your Court opinion 
I recommend you joi • 
April 24, 1986 
85-162 New Mexico v. Earnest 
Dear Bill: 
1 agr@e with your Per Curiam. 
Justice Rehnquiat 
lfp/ss 





•• .,. I"' ... . "' 
<( •• ·;. 
Sincerely, 
CH .. MBER!! OP' 
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.lqn"tmt OJ&mrt &tf tJrt ~ i\bdt• 
·-Jrittllhm. ~. OJ. 21lp'l~ 
June 12, 1986 
Re: 85-162 - New Mexico v. Earnest 
Dear Bill ': 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
~lt}tt"tmt <lfnnd ltf tlft ~b ~hdte 
'IJae~ ~. <lf. 211.;i'l~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 16, 1986 
Re: No. 85-162-New Mexico v. Earnest 
Dear Bill: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hprttttt <!j:cnrl of tift ~tti:ttb .ShtUtt 
.u!rhtgtcn. ~. <!j:. 2ll.?,.~ 
Re: No. 85-162, New Mexico v. Earnest 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your proposed ~curiam. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
June 16, 1986 
1st DRAFT 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White 




Justice O'Connor · 
From: Justice Rehnquist 
Circulated: JUN 1 8 1986 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-162 
NEW MEXICO, PETITIONER v. RALPH 
RODNEY EARNEST 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
NEW MEXICO 
[June-, 1986] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring. 
I agree that the decision of the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico should be vacated and the case remanded for further 
consideration in light of Lee v. Illinois, -- U. S. --
(1986). The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the ad-
mission against respondent of an out-of-court statement of a 
codefendant violated respondent's rights under the Con-
frontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court be-
lieved that Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 415 (1965), was 
"directly on point" and mandated the reversal of respondent's 
conviction because there had been. no opportunity for re-
spondent to cross-examine the codefendant, either at the 
time the statement was made or at trial. -- N. M. --, 
-, 703 P. 2d 872, - (1985). 
As Lee v. Illinois makes clear, to the extent that Douglas 
v. Alabama interpreted the Confrontation Clause as requir-
ing an opportunity for cross-examination prior to the admis-
sion of a codefendant's out-of-court statement, the case is no 
longer good law. Although Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 
(1980), did not attempt to set forth specific standards for con-
stitutional admissibility applicable to all categories of hear-
say, see United States v. Inadi, --U.S.--,-- (1986), 
that decision did establish that a lack of cross-examination is 
not necessarily fatal to the admissibility of evidence under 
the Confrontation Clause. See Lee v. Illinois,-- U. S., at 
• 
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In the instant case, ther.efore, the State is .entitled to 
an opportunity to overcome the general presumption of un-
reliability attaching to codefendant statements by demon-
strating that the particular statement at issue bears suffi-
cient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy Confrontation Clause 
concerns. 
June 18 , 1986 
85-162 New Mexico v . Earnest 
Dear Bill: 




cc : The Conference 
.._ ____ ""': .. 
.-., . ... ,., 
' '. ,. 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prtmt C!fau:rt af tlrt ~tb .i~a.tts 
jiJulfing~ ~. cq. 20,?~~ 
Re: No. 85-162 New Mexico v. Earnest 
Dear Chief, Lewis and Sandra, 
I 
June 18, 1986 
I have converted my Per Curiam opinion in the above case, 
which you previously joined, into. an opinion concurring in the 
order remanding the case to the New Mexico Supreme Court. I hope 
that you will be able to join the opinion in its new form. 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
Dear Bill: 
RE: 
i\lt.prtm:t <!fonri of tJtt ~~ iltatt• 
'Jfulrht\lhtn. Jl. Of. 20c?'l~ 
June 18, 1986 ~-
85-162 - New Mexico v. Earnest 
I join your concurring opining dated today. 
Justice Rehnquist 




.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.invrtntt <!Jourt af t4t ~Utlt Jtatt.tr 
Jla$lfhtgton, ~. <!}. 2ll.;t'!~ 
June 19, 1986 
Re: 85-162 New Mexico v. Earnest 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
85-162 New Mexico v. Earnest (Bill) 
WHR for the Court 4/7/86 
1st draft PC 4/17/86 
2nd draft 4/23/86 




WJB PC - first draft 6/3/87 
Joined by HAB 6/16/86 
TM 6/16/86 
WHR concurring 
1st draft 6/18/86 
2nd draft 6/19/86 
Joined by LFP 6/18/86 
CJ 6/18/86 
soc 6/19/86 
